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The influenza A viruses remain our most serious, known 
pandemic threat [1]. The possibility that a H5N1 high-
pathogenicity avian influenza A virus (HPAI) could cross 
over to become established in humans has been a very 
real concern for more than a decade. As a consequence, it 
was big news at the recent Malta ESWI [2] meeting when 
Ron  Fouchier  from  the  Erasmus  Medical  Centre  in 
Rotterdam announced that he had serially passaged an 
HPAI H5N1 virus in ferrets and achieved ’natural’ ferret-
to-ferret transmission. The first isolation ever (1933) of a 
human influenza A virus was in ferrets, and virologists 
generally regard these mustelids as the optimal model for 
most  aspects  of  human  influenza,  including  spread.  It 
was not highlighted in Malta, but we learned later that 
Yoshi Kawaoka at the University of Wisconsin, Madison 
had similar findings, though he started with a virus that 
had  been  genetically  modified  in  ways  that  might  be 
expected  to  make  it  less  virulent.  It  seems  that  others 
were  also  trying  with  reverse  genetics  approaches,  but 
failed.
The  Fouchier  experiment  was  the  talk  of  the  Malta 
meeting,  though  not  because  of  safety  concerns. 
Influenza virologists had been debating for years whether 
these HPAI H5N1 viruses could ever change in a way that 
would  allow  them  to  transmit  readily  between  human 
beings.  Informed  opinion  was  strongly  divided.  We  all 
knew that, given exposure to what has been assumed to 
be a large virus dose from an infected bird, people can 
develop severe H5N1 disease, with a very high death rate 
(345  fatalities  out  of  584  cases  since  2003)  [3].  A  few 
instances  where  family  members  may  have  been 
secondarily infected are on record, while two recent cases 
with  no  known  history  of  avian  contact  have  been 
reported  from  China.  We  are  not  there  yet,  but  what 
these  ferret  adaptation  studies  suggest  (though  by  no 
means  prove)  is  that  a  ‘human’  H5N1  pandemic  virus 
may indeed emerge from nature.
The issue of safety blew up much later when it came to 
publishing  the  Fouchier  et  al.  findings.  Should  these 
genetic changes be ‘out there’ for all to see? Might that 
information be used by sophisticated bioterrorists? The 
furor  about  whether  these  ferret  adaptation  studies 
should ever have been done and, if so, whether the results 
should  be  openly  published  came  as  something  of  a 
surprise to us. Though some medical epidemiologists did 
raise the issue of risk, the resurrection of the catastrophic 
1918 H1N1 virus by Jeff Taubengerger, Johan Hultin et al. 
more than a decade back met with general acclaim as an 
undoubted scientific achievement. The 1918 virus killed 
around 50 million people but nobody, so far as we recall, 
objected  when  (from  1999)  segments  of  the  virus 
sequence  started  to  appear  in  the  journals.  Was  the 
differ  ence that there was, at that time, more trust in those 
who  work  in  high  security  government  laboratories? 
Then, much of the 1918 sequence was published before 
9/11, 2001. The world has changed.
Of  course,  citizens,  commentators,  funding  agencies 
and national governments have every right to insist that 
what is being done in laboratories constitutes no threat to 
the population at large. That has long been recognized, 
and organizations like the NIH, the FDA, universities and 
research institutes ensure that rigorous training require-
ments,  review  processes  and  safety  checks/procedures 
are  in  place,  along  with  the  appropriate  hardware  and 
monitoring. Do such protocols need to be strengthened? 
That question is always appropriate, and should certainly 
be explored in the current climate.
One  thing  that  has  impressed  us,  as  immunologists 
rather  than  virologists  working  with  the  influenza  A 
viruses, is that while these pathogens transmit with such 
ease in nature, lab infections are rare [4-6]. Perhaps this 
reflects that the ’flu community is both very competent 
and operates under optimal conditions, but many other 
categories  of  viruses  and  bacteria  are  well-recognized 
threats  for  the  (no  doubt  capable  and  well-equipped) 
micro  biologists who work with them. Mistakes and acci-
dents do happen and any institution that operates with 
highly pathogenic organisms must have clear protocols in 
place to deal with such situations. There is a suspicion 
that the 1977 ‘Russian pandemic’ H1N1 virus may have 
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freeze [7]. Was this an escape from some ‘hidden experi-
ment’,  perhaps  involving  a  live  vaccine?  The  obvious 
inference is that it is essential for ’flu researchers every-
where to be open and interactive.
While we need to be assured that Taubenberger, Hultin, 
Fouchier,  Kawaoka-type  experiments  are  only  done  by 
responsible people working in safe, well-regulated insti-
tu  tions, the problem is that imposing highly restrictive 
constraints (BSL4 security, in space suits) means that few 
will  be  bothered  to  investigate  these  pathogens.  As  a 
consequence, we will know less about them. The reality is 
that  if  scientists  want  to  be  funded,  they  must  be 
productive and publish. It is always easy for a talented 
researcher to say: ‘too hard, too cumbersome, I’ll just go 
on  with  something  else.’  Those  reviewing  the  H5N1 
situation might ask whether that has indeed happened 
with the resurrected 1918 virus.
This issue of appropriate security is what needs to be 
resolved, hopefully in the up-coming WHO discussion 
forum.  Any  agreement  on  if,  when  and  where  such 
experiments  are  to  be  done  must  obviously  be  at  the 
global level. The era of ‘western exceptionalism’ in science 
is  as  dead  as  the  dodo.  The  selective  application  of 
excessive  requirements  by,  for  example,  Brussels  and 
Washington  will  simply  be  an  exercise  in  futility,  and 
possibly dangerous.
What are the real risks? Is it realistic to think of using a 
virulent ’flu virus to create terror and social disruption? 
Influenza goes everywhere. How does a science terrorist 
who seeks to target a specific ‘enemy’ protect his own 
people?  Are  our  security  services  on  the  watch  for  a 
rogue  state  that  is  vaccinating  against  H5N1  or  some 
other dangerous pathogen? Quite frankly, as a tactical, 
strategic or bioterror weapon, our guess is that ’flu makes 
little sense. Still, the Fouchier mutations might be just 
what some mad molecular ‘greenie’ needs to go forward 
with his dastardly plan of depopulating the planet. Why 
delay  though?  Once  Fouchier  had  talked  about  his 
experiments in Malta, all that our hypothetical maniac 
need do is to go out and buy a few dozen ferrets and 
some cages at a pet store, get an HPAI H5N1 virus from 
his source in an endemic country and do the experiment 
in a deserted farm or warehouse. Sounds like great TV. 
Anyway, virologists have known how to adapt ’flu viruses 
by  serial  passage  or  genetic  reassortment  for  half  a 
century, so what does Fouchier add?
What  must  be  avoided  at  all  costs  is  to  initiate 
processes that limit the exchange of information in the 
influenza field. The overwhelming probability is that any 
‘human pandemic’ H5N1 variant will come out of nature, 
not a laboratory. The combination of a superbly organ-
ized  network,  first  class  technology,  well-established 
centers and dedicated professionals means that the global 
monitoring mechanisms for influenza are the best there 
can  be.  The  Fouchier  and  Kawaoka  studies  identify 
mutations that these international ‘flu detectives’ will be 
watching  for.  The  last  thing  the  influenza  surveillance 
community  would  want  is  for  their  work  to  become 
exclusive,  especially  if  that  leads  to  any  reluctance  to 
make  newly  isolated,  dangerous  H5N1  ‘field  isolates’ 
immediately available for general scrutiny.
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